INTRODUCTION
Agency theory, which suggests a need for shareholders to monitor managers against opportunistic behaviors detrimental to firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) , has been widely applied to rationalize studies of managerial behavior and corporate governance (Dalton et al., 2007) . The primary critique against agency theory is that there is weak empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of policing mechanisms that seek to mitigate agency costs (Tosi et al., 2000; Dalton et al., 2007) . 1 For instance, empirical studies highlight the lack of efficient executive contracting (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) , the scarcity of relative performance evaluation of CEOs (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999) , and the weak power of shareholders in selecting directors (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) . A recognized limitation of the agency theory is that it is too general to account for the diversity of institutional contexts in which empirical studies are based (Bruce et al., 2005) . As a result, institutional-related theories may contribute to the development of principal-agency models that incorporate contextual influences and operationalize constructs within agency theory (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005) .
Institutional theory suggests that organizations conform to legitimacy imperatives due to state pressures, expectations of the profession, or collective norms of the environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . Such conformity could lead to passive acquiescence that does not contribute to the organizations' interest and efficiency (Tolbert, 1985; Zucker, 1977) . There are two offsetting effects that could influence firms' strategic responses to institutional processes.
The first is institutional change, which occurs as a result of organizations' responses to contingency shifts following internal or external events (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1992) . Such changes may arise either through the evolutionary process within an organization, or through a centralized process mandated across organizations (Kingston and Caballero, 2009 ). The second effect is institutional inertia, which causes organizations to resist innovations because they do not perceive a net benefit (Ruttan, 2006) , or because of the linkage and complementarities between organizations within the same domain (Aoki, 2006) . In other words, firms' corporate governance practices may be determined by conformity to environmental constraints. While centrally mandated governance reforms may invoke institutional changes, the impact may not occur uniformly across all firms due to variations in institutional inertia.
In this paper, we utilize an exogenous reform event in China and draw upon agency-and institutional-related theories to examine what effect controlling shareholders exhibit on the accountability of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to corporate fraud behavior. Regulatory reforms in China's transition from a centrally planned to market-oriented economy provide a natural experiment setting (Meyer, 1995) for empirically testing academic theories. We exploit the 2005 Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) in China to observe how institutional change influences principals' motivation in dealing with agency problems. We find evidence that this reform generates the required incentives for controlling shareholders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to strengthen CEO accountability against opportunistic behavior detrimental to firm value. We contribute to the strategic management and business ethics literature by demonstrating the importance of economic incentives in promoting corporate fraud deterrence in a prominent transitional economy.
Since China is an increasingly influential emerging country, its development experience offers useful implications for other aspiring economies. Although China's growth is impressive, its rapidly changing economic environment also creates a fertile ground for managerial opportunism underlying corporate fraud. Widespread corporate fraud could hamper China's economic aspirations since such corporate fraud negatively affects the confidence of stakeholders (Davidson and Worrell, 1988) , the job security of employees (Zahra et al., 2005) , and the well being of the entire society (Szwajkowski, 1985) . Existing studies suggest that top management is important antecedent of corporate fraud (Daboub et al., 1995; Donoher et al., 2007) and is often held accountable (Karpoff et al., 2008; Person, 2006) for such behavior.
However, the association between corporate fraud and managerial accountability in China has not been well examined. While existing studies of corporate fraud in China (Chen et al., 2006; Jia et al., 2009 ) largely focus on the influence of corporate governance, previous studies on
Chinese CEO turnover mainly investigate the link with firm performance (Conyon and He, 2012; Firth et al., 2006b; Kato and Long, 2006a, 2006b; Shen and Lin, 2009) . A common problem with studying corporate fraud and corporate governance is that they could be endogenously related. Therefore, exogenously induced changes due to regulatory reforms offer better research settings for such research questions. A common limitation of studying the relation between CEO turnover and performance in China is that a large number of firms (i.e., SOEs), have social and political agenda other than profit motives. Therefore, evaluating CEO turnover following corporate fraud provides a better test of managerial accountability.
The Chinese government maintains control of a large proportion of listed firms through ownership. Chinese SOE listed firms have three main features. First, they have access to government financial support and business contracts, which renders them less dependent on external funding provided by the capital market (Chen et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011) . In return, these firms are expected to promote the government's socio-political objectives, which could obligate them to deviate from the pursuit of increasing their value in capital market (Allen et al., 2005) . Second, their managerial appointment is also influenced by the government (Hassard et al., 1999) , reducing the accountability of managers to outside investors. This dynamic in SOE firms increases the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997) acting against the interest of minority shareholders (Fan et al., 2007) . Third, to strengthen government control of listed firms, China also has imposed a split share structure since the inception of its stock market in early 1990s, and was only gradually eliminated following the enactment of the SSSR. Under this approach, state shareholders hold restricted shares that cannot be traded freely in the stock market, as can shares held by private shareholders.
The split share structure inevitably creates a misalignment of interest between state and private shareholders, which has negative implications for corporate governance. Unlike the private shareholders that hold tradable shares, state shareholders are deprived of the wealth implication of share price movement in the stock market. As a result, the state shareholders are more interested in pursuing either accounting-based performance targets or political objectives (Firth et al., 2006) , which are not necessarily helpful in maximizing the long-run market value of the firms. Thus, the split share structure renders state shareholders reluctant to ensure managers maximize the market value of their firms or to monitor managers against opportunistic behavior detrimental to firm value. The SSSR that began in 2005 gradually abolished the trading restriction of state shareholders, and has the potential to invoke institutional changes to improve corporate governance, particularly among the SOE listed firms controlled by state shareholders.
The aforementioned theoretical rationale and institutional setting suggest that agency problems are expected to be dealt with less effectively among Chinese SOE listed firms and that the SSSR may contribute to the reduction of this problem. We can therefore make the following testable predictions regarding managerial accountability following corporate fraud.
First, we can predict that the likelihood of CEO turnover following regulatory enforcement action against corporate fraud is lower among the SOE listed firms than their non-SOE counterparts. This is consistent with the institutional theory in the sense that the governance practice adopted by SOE listed firms may be sub-optimal as a result of conforming to state pressure than market forces. Second, following the SSSR, the likelihood of CEO turnover following enforcement actions should increase more among SOEs than non-SOEs. This is consistent with institutional changes seeking to improve corporate governance being more effective when stakeholders are provided with greater economic incentive. Third, if the SSSR indeed increases CEO turnover likelihood following enforcement actions among SOEs, this effect should also be more pronounced among SOEs that are more receptive and proactive in implementing the reform process. This is consistent with cross-sectional variations in firm-specific institutional inertia affecting the impact of innovations. Using a sample drawn from Chinese listed firms over the period of 1999 to 2008, we find empirical evidence consistent with our three predictions. The data include 409 cases of regulatory enforcements actions against corporate fraud, each matched with comparable firms by year, industry, and size.
Our findings contribute to the literature on corporate governance and emerging market development by providing the following implications. First, although agency theory predicts that the principal would monitor agents against opportunistic behavior, we show that the economic incentive of the principal is a crucial prerequisite for this relation to hold. While existing corporate governance literature largely focuses on how agents can be incentivized to pursue the interest of the principal, we provide an example from a natural experiment that shows motivating the principal also matters. This may be achieved either by increasing the benefits of monitoring, which we demonstrate in our context, or by reducing the cost of monitoring, which can occur if the enactment of regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. effectively reduces information asymmetry. Second, we show that as China evolves from a centrally planned to market-oriented economy, there is a need for institutional reforms at a matching pace to strengthen corporate governance. Our findings imply that the split share structure has impeded corporate governance especially among SOE listed firms during the period in which it was imposed. For China to fully realize the potential of its economic growth opportunities, institutional changes, such as those introduced by the SSSR, should be accelerated.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS

Theoretical background
Agency theory is predicated on the assumption that shareholders and managers seek to maximize their own welfare in different ways (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Davis et al., 1997) . The agency problem occurs when shareholders cannot effectively monitor managers against opportunism and expropriation (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The extant literature provides no shortage of evidence to show that managers prioritize their own interests above that of the shareholders.
For instance, managers try to report their performance more favorably (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983) , make investment decisions at the expense of shareholders (Jarrell et al., 1988; Morck et al., 1989) , and attempt to insulate themselves from internal (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989 ) and external (Dann and DeAngelo, 1983 ) governance mechanisms. Agency costs borne by the shareholders include expenditures to monitor and align incentives of manager, as well as the residual loss of firm value that arises from conflicts of interest with managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . There are three main mechanisms for minimizing this residual loss of firm value: external market for corporate control, incentive alignment through executive remuneration, and monitoring by a board of directors (Dalton et al., 2007) . Since shareholders are the legal owner and residual claimants of a firm, the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance (Bebchuk, 2006) stipulates that the board of directors has a responsibility to protect shareholder interests above all other groups of stakeholders. According to this view, the most important duties of the board of directors are to represent shareholders in carrying out corporate governance mechanisms such as reporting, auditing, and policies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . While empirical studies support a positive relationship between shareholders' influence over the board of directors and firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Campbell et al., 2012) , further evidence on the causal nature of this relationship in natural experiment setting is warranted.
CEO dismissal is one of the most important powers that the board of directors, as the representative of shareholders, has to curb the agency problem (Weisbach, 1988; Zald, 1969) .
The negative relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance is well established in the literature (Denis and Kruse, 2000; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003) . However, the board's decision to dismiss a CEO for poor performance can be affected by many socio-political factors. These include the degree to which the board's allegiance is to shareholders (Allen and Panian, 1982) , the power of the board relative to the CEO (Ocasio, 1994; Zhang, 2006) , and expectations of board members, such as beliefs of what constitutes good performance, awareness of other firms' performance levels, and attribution regarding managerial ability to change firm performance (Fredrickson et al., 1988) . Performance expectations are also complicated by the existence of information asymmetry between the board and CEO (Zajac, 1990) , as well as organizational and environmental factors beyond managerial control (Holmstrom, 1982) . Positive accounting theory (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983) suggests that managerial incentives to manipulate financial statements undermine the credibility of accounting-based performance targets. Behavioral finance theory (Hirshleifer, 2002) implies that stock returns may be influenced by investor sentiment and rendered less reliable as a criterion for judging CEO performance. As a result of these uncertainties, it is easier for the board to base CEO dismissal decisions on more observable and legitimate indicators of CEO performance (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011) . If this is the case, then we expect explicit cases of CEO wrongdoings such as corporate fraud, which is based on investigations by regulatory authorities, to play an important role in formulating the board's CEO dismissal decision.
Corporate fraud is a leading symptom of agency problems, and its influence on CEO dismissal is well-documented in studies of the U.S. market (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008; Person, 2006) . Corporate fraud reduces investor confidence and shareholder wealth, which in turn leads to misallocation of capital and instability in the financial market (Karpoff, et al., 1999; Murphy et al., 2009 ). The literature identifies top management as one of the key antecedents of corporate fraud (Baucus, 1994; Efendi et al., 2007; Khanna et al., 2012 (Maignan and Ferrell, 2004; Sims and Brinkmann, 2003 ) is more effective in bringing about the institutional changes needed to reduce the underlying incentives of corporate fraud.
An institutional perspective may compliment agency theory in helping to explain empirical evidence of managerial behavior by recognizing contextual influences and identifying key constructs in the principal-agent relationship (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2005) .
Institutions are defined as a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of social behavior (Greif, 2006) . Institutional theory traditionally focuses on legitimizing the process and tendency for organizational practices to be taken for granted and imitated by other organizations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . It suggests that organizational behavior is less driven by market forces or efficiency concerns, and more by conformity to state, societal, and culture pressures, as well as legacy and tradition (Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) . Compliance with institutional norms and requirements generates rewards such as stability, legitimacy, and access to resources (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . In the context of corporate governance, firms may not necessarily adopt best practices due to the need to conform to external constituents.
Institutional changes, or deinstitutionalization, refer to the weakening or transformation of existing corporate practices, and their substitution by new approaches (Ansari et al., 2010; Chung and Beamish, 2005; Sherer and Lee, 2002) . Oliver (1992) suggests three possible reasons for institutional changes: economic, social, and political pressures. Economic pressure stems from changes such as increased competition or reduced rewards for sustaining current practices. Social pressure results from changes in organizational structure and the external environment. Political pressure arises from shifts in the underlying distribution of power, conflicting internal interests, and changes in dependency patterns. In the context of corporate governance, externally mandated reforms may change the governance practices of firms if they alter the economic pressures to which firms or their stakeholders are exposed.
Institutional inertia, or resistance to changes, causes the adoption of new practices to be symbolic or adapted when it is not compatible with the organization Zajac, 1994, 2001 ). Institutional inertia tends to increase with an organization's age, size, and complexity (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) , and can be strengthened by the existence of strategic linkages and complementarities across organizations (Aoki, 2001) . The stability of institutions can also be self-reinforcing because it influence and align people's beliefs, behavior, and preferences, which in turn also legitimizes the norms and practices of institutions (Hodgson, 2004) . Ruttan (2006) argues that institutional innovation requires mobilization of political resources and that institutional inertia is likely to persist as long as the expected return does not exceed the marginal cost of mobilizing these resources. In the context of corporate governance, firm-specific institutional inertia could moderate the effectiveness of externally mandated reforms in addressing agency problems.
Institutional settings
Fraudulent corporate behavior common among Chinese listed firms ranges from delaying disclosure, to providing false statement, to embezzlement (Chen et al., 2005) . In
China, corporate fraud is frequently motivated by two general factors. First, it can be stimulated by regulatory pressure and financial needs. For instance, listing is only allowed after two consecutive years of profit (Aharony et al., 2000) . Similarly, issuing more shares is only allowed if a firm's return on equity is above 10% for three continuous years (Chen and Yuan, 2004) , while delisting occurs after three consecutive years of losses (Jiang and Wang, 2008) .
While these rules are intended as a way to guide capital toward well-performing firms, it also generates incentives for listed firms to instigate fraud in order to meet the requirements. Second, corporate fraud may be more common in a dynamic and rapidly evolving environment ( and Solutions for Listed Firm Checks. The CSRC carries out this duty through regular reviews and regular inspections of firms (Hou and Moore, 2010) . It also responds to information and complaints of fraud allegations from investors, employees, and media. If misconduct is confirmed, the CSRC's enforcement actions could range from internal and public criticism to criminal prosecution. The CSRC has been criticized for being ineffective in identifying and prosecuting fraud (Anderson, 2000) . Political pressures may affect the power of the CSRC, since it is a ministry-level commission that answers to the state (Chen et al., 2005; Liebman and Milhaupt, 2008) .
Chinese-style capitalism is characterized by a high degree of state control of listed firms (Bai et al., 2000; Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011) and this distinguishes China from other ex-communist transitional economies. Despite three decades of transition from a centrally planned to market-oriented economy, the Chinese government (at both the central and local level) still maintains control of a majority of the listed firms through state shareholders represented by government agencies and other SOEs. This reflects the prevailing socio-political ideology of China. On the one hand, the government wants to transform listed firms into modern enterprises that are capable of raising their own capital in the market. On the other hand, the government wishes to retain influence over listed firms to forward a political and social agenda, such as regional development and maintenance of job security. The government not only controls SOE listed firms through ownership, but also influences managerial appointment (Hassard et al., 1999) . In return, the government provides the listed firms it controls with financial support through subsidies (Allen et al., 2005) and favorable loans (Chen et al., 2011a) .
Since the establishment of its stock exchanges in early 1990s, China has also imposed what is known as the split share structure to maintain government control of listed firms. Under this approach, state shareholders held restricted shares while outside private shareholders held tradable shares. Restricted shares are not freely tradable on the stock exchange and can only be transferred privately or auctioned, usually at a discounted value relative to the firm's freely tradable shares (Chen and Xiong, 2001; Huang and Xu, 2009 ). The central and local governments hold restricted shares through their asset management agencies or affiliated SOEs.
However, existing studies suggests that the maintenance of Chinese state ownership through the split share structure may contribute to a reduction in the corporate governance quality and performance efficiency of SOE listed firms (Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005) . Since controlling state shareholders hold restricted shares that are not tradable, their wealth is less directly linked to stock returns. Thus, controlling shareholders of such firms have less pronounced incentive to monitor managers and ensure that they maximize firms' market value.
For instance, existing studies show that CEO compensation (Firth et al., 2006a (Firth et al., , 2007 and turnover (Conyon and He, 2012) in Chinese SOE listed firms are less sensitive to stock return performance relative to non-SOE listed firms.
Aware of the drawback of the split share structure, the CSRC announced on April 29 cash flow problem among firms after the reform, and the effect is more pronounced for those with weaker governance. Hou et al. (2012) analyze price synchronicity and show evidence consistent with increased firm-specific disclosure among SOEs subsequent to the reform. In terms of the reform negotiation process, existing studies show that risk sharing incentives (Li et al., 2011) and mutual fund ownership (Firth et al., 2010) .
Hypotheses development
The Chinese institutional setting affords a unique natural experiment to test our theoretical hypotheses in an exogenous context. Agency theory stipulates that residual loss of firm value arises due to conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The board of directors is one of the main governance mechanisms to address agency problems (Dalton et al., 2007) , and CEO dismissal is one of the main tools at their disposal (Weisbach, 1988) . Dismissal decisions can be complicated by factors such as information asymmetry between the board and CEO (Zajac, 1990) , and corporate fraud identified by external regulatory authorities provides board of directors with a more legitimate cause to discipline their CEO. Nevertheless, institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) suggests that conformity to external pressures, which helps generate stability and access to resources (DiMaggio, 1988) , could cause firms to adopt practices that do not contribute to firm efficiency (Tolbert, 1985) . Although institutional change could be invoked centrally across organizations (Kingston and Caballero, 2009), and by creating economic incentives (Oliver, 1993) , resistance to innovation due to institutional inertia could also occur if the perceived benefit does not exceed the cost of adopting new practices (Ruttan, 2006) . These institutional effects could influence managerial accountability for corporate fraud in China.
In the context of Chinese SOE listed firms, state financial support and political influence over managerial appointment are expected to affect the way in which such firms address agency problems. Financial assistance from the government decreases SOE listed firms' dependence on the capital market for external funding (Chen et al., 2011) , which in turn reduces the concern of such firms over how their behavior affects the market value. Therefore, when corporate fraud is uncovered by the regulatory authority, the market value decline that ensues may not affect SOE listed firms as much as their non-SOE counterparts. Government involvement in managerial appointment increases the likelihood of an entrenchment effect (Fan et al., 2007) , which in turn reduces the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms.
As a result of both effects, the board of directors in SOE listed firms might be more reluctant to hold their CEOs accountable after corporate fraud behavior has been identified. Consistent with institutional theory, Chinese SOE listed firms' willingness to conform to state pressure is motivated by financial assistance and political support, and this compliance could determine their corporate governance practices more than market forces. This institutional perspective contextualizes the effect that state control has on the way Chinese listed firms address agency problems. Therefore, the intersection of agency-and institutional-related theories leads us to formulate the first testable hypothesis: However, institutional inertia can be difficult to capture empirically as it is affected by complex interactions between a wide range of factors relating to wealth distribution, resource ownership, and knowledge (Greif and Laitin, 2004) . In the context of the SSSR, we argue that institutional inertia can be measured by the amount of consideration that restricted shareholders agree to pay tradable shareholders, and by the length of the negotiation period required to decide this amount. As explained earlier, the gradual elimination of trading restrictions does not commence until the negotiation process is completed, and an agreement is reached over the amount of consideration to be paid out. We expect that controlling state shareholders of Chinese SOE listed firms with less institutional inertia to governance improvements will be more willing to offer higher consideration to tradable shareholders, and will shorten the length of the negotiation period. Controlling state shareholders are expected to be willing to bear higher initial costs and accelerate the negotiation process only if they perceive higher personal economic benefits from trading shares afterward. Therefore, based on the intersection of 
The dependent variable CTO equals 1 if CEO turnover occurred in current year t and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged 1 year (i.e., t-1) to deal with possible causality issues. FRAUD equals 1 if the firm experienced regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. SOE equals 1 if the firm is state-controlled and 0 otherwise. MV is firm size measured as log market capitalization. PB is firm growth measured as price-to-book ratio. ROA is firm profitability measured as industry-adjusted return-on-asset. RET is stock market performance measured as annual stock return over the risk-free rate. ST equals 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment (i.e., those with two consecutive years of losses) and 0 otherwise. DIFF is ownership concentration measured by the difference in percentage shareholding between the largest and the second-and third-largest shareholders.
5 FOWN is the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders. RESH is the ratio of restricted shares to total shares. DUAL equals 1 for firms with a CEO who also serves as board chairman and 0 otherwise. 6 BDMEET and SBMEET are the activeness of board of directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured by the number meetings held during the year. BDSIZE and SBSIZE are the size of the board of directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured as the number of members. BIND is the degree of independence of the board of directors, measured as the ratio of independent directors to total directors. We also incorporate a set of dummy variables to control for fixed effects associated with sector (Industry) and time (Year). In this analysis, coefficient α 1 indicates whether current-year CEO turnover is related to past-year regulatory enforcement action for corporate fraud among non-SOE listed firms. Coefficient α 3 indicates whether this relationship is different between non-SOE and SOE listed firm groups. If coefficient α 3 < 0, it suggests that CEO turnover to corporate fraud relationship is significantly lower among SOE listed firms relative to their non-SOE counterparts, consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H1.
To test hypothesis H2, which predicts that the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate fraud increases among SOE listed firms after the SSSR, we apply the logistic regression analyses based on Equation 2 below in the SOE and non-SOE listed firm subsamples separately: 5 We follow the approach of Gul et al. (2010) . 6 We also have carried out analyses controlling for CEO-specific variables such as tenure and gender and our main inference remained unchanged. However, due to limitations in data availability of these variables in GTA CSMAR, including these CEO-specific variables results in a substantial reduction of sample size. 
SSSR equals 1 for years after the firm has been selected to carry out the negotiation process and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined the same as in Equation 1. In this analysis, coefficient β 1 indicates the relationship between current-year CEO turnover is related to past-year regulatory enforcement action against corporate fraud before the SSSR.
Coefficient β 3 indicates the incremental effect of the SSSR on this relationship. If β 3 > 0 for the SOE listed firm subsample but not the non-SOE listed firm subsample, this suggests that the reform triggers increased CEO accountability for fraud among firms in which the elimination of restricted shares is likely to create the most economic incentives to improve governance. In other words, we have evidence that is consistent with hypothesis H2.
To test hypothesis H3, which predicts that the increase in the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate fraud among SOE listed firms is greater among firms with less institutional inertia, we apply logistic regression analyses based on Equation 2 above in higher and lower institutional inertia SOE listed firms separately. Within the SOE subsample, we classify firms as higher (lower) institutional inertia groups if the reform consideration payout ratio agreed upon by restricted and tradable shareholders is below (above) median, or if the length of the solicitation period of the reform negotiation process is longer (shorter) than the median. If coefficient β 3 > 0 only among SOE listed firms with higher consideration payouts and shorter negotiation periods, this suggests that the increase in CEO accountability for fraud following SSSR mainly among such firms with less institutional inertia that would impede the perceived economic benefit of this reform to controlling state shareholders. This would indicate the existence of empirical evidence consistent with hypothesis H3. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Panels A, B, and C report the full sample, fraud-committing firm subsample, and the matched firm subsample, respectively. Table 2 reveals that the fraud firms have significantly higher CEO turnover relative to comparable firms. This suggests that, on average, there is CEO accountability for corporate fraud in China. Fraud firms also have significantly higher growth, lower profitability, and are more likely to be in distress. This finding implies that weak performing and distressed firms that are overpriced by the market may experience greater pressure to commit corporate fraud. The likelihood that fraud firms are SOE listed firms is not significantly different from matched firms. This reduces the possibility that our subsequent empirical analysis could be biased in favor of finding a less pronounced relationship between CEO turnover and fraud among SOE listed firms.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS Descriptive statistics and correlations
[ insert Table 2 here ] Table 3 presents the correlation analysis between our variables. CEO turnover exhibits a significantly positive relationship with corporate fraud and distress, and has a significantly negative relationship with firm size and profitability. This suggests that, on average, CEOs are held accountable for corporate fraud and poor performance. SOE listed firms tend to be larger, more profitable, and less distressed. One possible explanation is that SOE listed firms tend to receive financial support and business contracts from the government. However, such firms also have higher ownership concentration, more restricted shares, and a less independent board, indicating weaker governance mechanisms. Notice that the correlation between State and both Turnover and Fraud are statistically insignificant. This insignificance suggests that the likelihood of CEO turnover and corporate fraud are not necessarily higher among SOE listed firms than their non-SOE counterparts. In other words, these two groups of firms are on a level playing field in terms of these two variables. Thus, our subsequent analysis of the relationship between CEO turnover and fraud is unlikely to be biased in favor of any particular group.
[ insert Table 3 here ] Table 4 presents results from the test of hypothesis H1 using a logistic regression analysis based on Equation 1. We regress the indicator of current year CEO turnover on a lagged indicator of corporate fraud conditional on SOE indicator, and apply a wide range of control variables. In Regressions 1 to 3, the marginal effect of Fraud is consistently and significantly positive. This suggests a significant relation between CEO turnover and fraud among non-SOE listed firms. For instance, Regression 3, where all control variables are applied, suggests a 20.90% (t-statistic = 3.76) increase in the probability of current year CEO turnover associated with past year corporate fraud among non-SOEs. However, the marginal effect of the interaction term Fraud×State is significantly negative throughout. For instance, it is -16.56%
Test of hypothesis H1
(t-statistic = -2.58) in Regression 3, when all control variables are applied. This indicates that CEOs of SOE listed firms are relatively less accountable to corporate fraud than their counterparts in non-SOE listed firms. The sum of the estimates for Fraud and Fraud×State is statistically insignificant, indicating that in SOE listed firms there is no relationship between current year turnover and lagged fraud. In other words, we observe empirical evidence that is consistent with hypothesis H1, which predicts that state control of listed firms moderates CEO turnover following corporate fraud regulatory enforcement actions. Our results are robust to controls for firm characteristics, performance, governance, and industry and year effects.
[ insert Table 4 here ] Table 5 presents results from the test of hypothesis H2 using a logistic regression analysis The fact that the interaction term Fraud×SSSR is significantly positive only in SOE listed firms but not among non-SOE listed firms also strengthens our inference that this effect is attributed to the SSSR because restricted shares are more prevalent in SOEs.
Test of hypothesis H2
[ insert Table 5 here ] Table 6 presents results from the test of hypothesis H3 using a logistic regression analysis based on Equation 2 separately for high and low institutional inertia SOE listed firms. We regress the indicator of current year CEO turnover on a lagged indicator of corporate fraud conditional on SSSR indicator, and apply a wide array of control variables. In Panel A, we define firms with higher (lower) institutional inertia as those with below (above) median reform consideration payout. In Panel B, we define firms with higher (lower) institutional inertia as those with longer (shorter) than median solicitation period for the reform negotiation process.
Test of hypothesis H3
7 Throughout group. This suggests that the increased CEO accountability for fraud among SOE listed firms that we observe in Table 5 is mainly concentrated among those with controlling state shareholders that are willing to pay more consideration and speed up the negotiation process, which we assume to have less institutional inertia against governance changes after the reform.
In other words, we have evidence that is consistent with our prediction in hypothesis H3. The observation that two variables specifically associated with the implementation of the reform have a significant effect in determining the increase in CEO turnover after fraud further strengthens our inference that this effect is brought about by the SSSR.
[ insert Table 6 ]
Additional tests
Although we expect CEOs of state-controlled Chinese listed firms to be less accountable to their fraudulent behavior, it may be difficult for state controlling shareholders to justify more serious cases such as those that invoke public outrage and severe regulatory enforcement actions. To reduce damages to the firms' reputation and political capital, even state-controlled listed firms are likely to distant itself from CEOs under such circumstances. Defending CEOs that deliberately seek to mislead the public or are judged by regulatory authority to require severe prosecution are more likely to provoke adverse public opinion against the firm. To perform the tests, we partition our sample by fraud type into those that deliberately seek to mislead investors through information disclosure misconduct (as more serious frauds) and other types of fraud (as less serious frauds), and again partition the full sample by regulatory enforcement type into those that involves actual material penalty (as more serious enforcement actions) and those that only invoke verbal warning (as less serious enforcement actions). The untabulated results show that the marginal effect of Fraud×State is economically and statistically significantly negative only among less serious corporate frauds or regulatory enforcement cases. It shows that the lack of CEO accountability to corporate fraud in state-controlled Chinese listed firms is indeed mainly concentrated in minor fraud cases and light penalty that are less likely to provoke adverse public opinion.
Finally, as China is a vast country with unequal regional development, it would also be interesting to explore whether regional development disparity associated with variations in investor protection and market pressures affects CEO accountability 8 . To perform our analysis, we partition the sample based on the regional dummies constructed in Firth et al. (2006a) . 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The SSSR is essentially a "natural experiment" that enables us to examine how changes in the economic incentives of controlling shareholders influence managerial accountability for corporate fraud. From corporate scandals to financial crises, the experiences in developed countries over the past decade have demonstrated the importance of corporate transparency and investor confidence in the efficient allocation of financial resources in the capital market, which in turn affects the wider economy. Therefore, the strengthening of corporate governance and managerial accountability is essential to the economic aspirations of China as well as other developing countries. Our empirical study of the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate fraud among Chinese listed firm reveals three main findings, which we contextualize and explain by drawing on agency-and institutional-related theories. First, there is less CEO accountability for corporate fraud among SOE listed firms relative to their non-SOE counterparts. Second, there is an increase in CEO turnover following fraud among SOE listed firms after the institution of SSSR. Third, we show that after SSSR, the increase in CEO accountability for fraud among SOE listed firms is more pronounced among firms that are more willing to implement the reform process.
Our first finding implies that state control of listed firms in China impedes the efficacy of governance mechanisms to address agency costs. The existing corporate governance literature suggests that ownership concentration exerts two counteracting effects. One is the incentive alignment effect (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) , when the interests and wealth of large shareholders are associated with the value of the firm that they control. Another is the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002) , when large shareholders collude with the management to expropriate minority outside investors. Unlike evidence from developed
Western economies, existing studies of China often suggest that ownership concentration by state shareholders leads to an entrenchment effect that impedes corporate governance from the point of view of minority equity investors (Fan et al., 2007; Tihanyi and Hegarty, 2007) . 9 For instance, empirical studies provide evidence that Chinese SOE listed firms are more likely to collude with auditors (Wang et al., 2008) , have less corporate transparency (Gul et al., 2010) , less financial reporting conservatism (Chen et al., 2010) . However, performance improves after controls are transferred from state to private shareholders (Chen et al., 2008) . Unlike previous studies in China, we examine managerial accountability for corporate fraud, and argue that we provide more direct evidence consistent with an entrenchment effect in SOE listed firms. 9 Studies of Western developed economies often associate large shareholders with the incentive alignment effect and better monitoring of executives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 ). For instance, empirical studies reveal that large shareholders are associated with increased managerial turnover (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) and tighter control over executive compensation (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 ).
However, these previous studies of SSSR draw inference of governance improvements indirectly from changes in firm characteristics. We argue that managerial accountability provides a more direct setting to evaluate changes in corporate governance, and we also infer that SSSR contributes to the reduction of agency problems. shareholders can sell at least a portion of their holdings within the 36 months following ratification of the compensation plan, depending on the proportion of ownership. Thus, this argument also ignores the wealth implication of a rising share price for the restricted shareholders over this transition period.
The evidence from our study does not necessarily deny the value of the political connections of managers and controlling shareholders in a transitional economy, but rather implies the need for better corporate governance mechanisms to reduce the potential negative effects of such connections. Some studies suggest that political connection is a managerial resource beneficial to Chinese firms. For instance, Xin and Pearce (1996) argue that political connections are a substitute for insufficient institutional infrastructure, Lou (2003) suggests they provide flexible resource allocation in a factor mobility constrained environment, and
Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002) argue that they facilitate business in an uncertain environment.
There is also evidence that political connection influences market benefit (Davies et al., 1995) (Tsang, 1998) , and improves firm performance (Nee, 1992; Peng and Luo, 2000) . Our study also confirms the benefit of on-going reform of Chinese SOEs. Existing studies in China have revealed a sustained reform process that seeks to evolve and adapt SOEs toward market (Ralston et al., 2006) . For instance, at the early stage of this evolvement, bonuses to reward performance have been reintroduced to motivate employees (Chen, 1995) , and short-term renewable contracts have replaced life-long positions (Tenev et al., 2002) .
Subsequently, the government has also introduced regulations to punish business failures (Steinfeld, 1998) and has deregulated some protected sectors (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002) .
Finally, and more generally, our results highlight the importance of an evolving role for understanding the interplay between legal institutions, finance, management, and governance in emerging markets that is sensitive to the time series changes in regulatory reforms and evolving institutional structures, as highlighted by Allen et al. (2005), and not static comparisons at a particular point in time.
Future research could also examine whether the SSSR affects other aspects of corporate behavior after fraud. 12 For example, to restore investor confidence after committing fraud, are
SOEs more likely to dismiss auditors in the post-reform period? Furthermore, would investors find reported earnings more informative in the post-reform period among firms that replace the CEO or auditors after fraud detection? 12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these interesting ideas. MV is firm size measured as log market capitalization. PB is firm growth measured as price-to-book ratio. ROA is firm profitability measured as industry-adjusted return-on-asset. RET is stock market performance measured as annual stock return over the risk-free rate. ST equals 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment (i.e., those with two consecutive years of losses) and 0 otherwise. DIFF is ownership concentration measured by the difference in percentage shareholding between the largest and the second-and third-largest shareholders. FOWN is the proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders. RESH is the ratio of restricted shares to total shares. DUAL equals 1 for firms with a CEO who also serves as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BDMEET and SBMEET are the activeness of board of directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured by the number meetings held during the year. BDSIZE and SBSIZE are the size of the board of directors and supervisory board, respectively, each measured as the number of members. BIND is the degree of independence of the board of directors, measured as the ratio of independent directors to total directors. Panels A, B, and C report the whole sample, fraud firms sample, and matched firm sample (i.e., non-fraud committing firms), respectively. Our sample period is 1999 to 2008. *** Tables 2 and 3 . Marginal effects are reported. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-statistics in brackets are tests of differences between pre-and post-SSSR subsamples. *** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tables 2 and 3 . Marginal effects are reported. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-statistics in brackets are tests of differences between high and low consideration payout subsamples.
***
